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CASENOTES
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States: The Federal
Circuit Addresses Countervailing Duties Against
Nonmarket Economy Imports
In a hypothetical scenario, the President of the Southern Republic of the
Pacific calls a summit of local economists and manufacturers to discuss increas-
ing exports to the United States. A lobbyist for Pacific Textiles Exports, Lim-
ited, describes his company's export problems. Although Pacific Textiles
produces quality clothing at lower than U.S. market prices, their representative
claims that Southern has been unable to enter the U.S. market because ship-
ping, administrative, and other overhead costs have pushed its prices above
U.S. market prices. To establish a substantial market share in the United
States, the lobbyist requests some form of direct or indirect government subsidy.
The President guarantees him government assistance.
Immediately to the north, the Ministry for Textile Production of the North-
ern People's Republic of the Pacific issues its annual People's Directive Number
3457, specifying the materials to be allocated to textile factories and the prices
at which the textiles will be sold. The Directive's prices are significantly lower
than market prices for similar textiles manufactured in the United States.
While in the past the People's Republic has not traded with the United States,
the soothing of cold war tensions has lessened trade barriers, opening the U.S.
market for the first time.
In the United States, the media reports these concurrent, but independent,
events in the two Pacific basin nations. Congress, the White House, and the
Department of Commerce are flooded with mail. Textile workers fear unemploy-
ment. Farmers worry cotton sales will drop. Textile factory owners know they
cannot match the price of Pacific basin goods. The cry for protectionism
manifests itself in a call for countervailing duties against the foreign goods.
Under U.S. law, domestic manufacturers and producers may pe-
tition the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the Depart-
ment of Commerce to levy countervailing duties (CVDs) against
imported goods when foreign governments extend subsidies, boun-
ties or grants to the manufacturers, producers, or exporters of the
goods.' The ITA may levy a CVD to offset any price reduction and
restore the import's price to market level. 2
Although the ITA can easily detect and measure subsidies on
imports from market economies, the ITA's task is complicated when
dealing with imports from centrally-planned, nonmarket economies
I See 3J. PATrISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS § 6.01[1] (1984).
2 Id.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 12
(NMEs). 3  Due to an absence of market forces influencing prices,
there is no easily ascertainable subsidy. In fact, a subsidy arguably
does not exist at all because all supply and demand decisions are
centrally made. In Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States,4 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that
countervailable subsidies could not be found in certain economic in-
centive programs conducted by the Soviet Union or the German
Democratic Republic.
Georgetown Steel arose from petitions filed by several U.S. manu-
facturers seeking CVDs against two kinds of NME imports: carbon
steel wire rods and potassium chloride (potash).5 After a lengthy
discussion on the timeliness of filing complaints with the Court of
International Trade (CIT), the Federal Circuit remanded the carbon
steel wire cases to the CIT with directions to dismiss for lack ofjuris-
diction.6 The court addressed the potash cases on their merits.
At issue was whether potash imported to the United States from
the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) and German Democratic Republic
3 An NME exists when a centralized mechanism or authority rather than supply and
demand forces drive the pricing and allocation structure (e.g. a communist or purely social-
ist state). The ITA defines nonmarket economy as one that "operates on principles of
nonmarket cost or pricing structures so that sales or offers for sale of merchandise in that
country or to other countries do not reflect the market value of the merchandise." Potash
from the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R., 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984). In Georgetown Steel Corp.
v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the Federal Circuit also adopted
this definition.
4 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
5 The CIT consolidated the cases. Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1310. See also Conti-
nental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), vacated sub nom.
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
6 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1313. In November 1983 several U.S. steel companies
filed CVD petitions with the ITA against Czechoslovakian and Polish carbon steel wire rod
manufacturers. Id. at 1310. See also infra note 70 and accompanying text. Although the
carbon steel wire claims came to the Federal Circuit as a consolidated case with the potash
claims, the Federal Circuit dismissed the carbon steel wire claims on procedural grounds.
After reviewing the procedure for timely filing of a complaint with the CIT, the Fed-
eral Circuit remanded the steel rod cases to the CIT with directions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1313. According to the statutory rules of the
CIT, a party seeking review of an ITA determination must either (1) file a summons and a
complaint simultaneously within 30 days of the determination or (2) file a summons within
30 days of the determination and a complaint within 30 days of the summons. Id. at 1311.
Although Georgetown Steel, using the latter method of filing, mailed its complaint to the
CIT within 30 days of its summons, the complaint was returned due to insufficient postage
and was remailed after the 30 day deadline. Id.
Holding that the CIT did not have jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit strictly read CIT
Rule 5(g) requiring "the proper postage [be] affixed" before a pleading is considered filed
with the CIT. Id. at 1313. The court rejected an earlier CIT decision inJernberg Forgings
Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 62, vacated on other grounds, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 245
(1984), which required only that the summons be mailed within 30 days of the determina-
tion in order to meet CITjurisdictional requirements. Id. InJernbeig, as in Georgetoun Steel,
the complaint was initially mailed within 30 days of the summons but was returned due to
insufficient postage. The Federal Circuit, however, extended the strict mailing require-
ments to the pleadings as well as the summons, relying on NEC Corp. v. United States,
622 F. Supp. 1086 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), reh 'g denied, 628 F. Supp. 976 (1986). Georgetown
Steel, 801 F.2d at 1312-13.
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(G.D.R.) was subsidized in the form of a "bounty" or "grant" under
section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (1930 Act), thereby permitting
the ITA to levy a CVD. 7 After investigating the CVD petitions, the
ITA concluded as a matter of law that section 303 was inapplicable to
NMEs because subsidies by definition do not exist in NMEs. 8 The
CIT reversed the ITA, stating that the ITA made a "basic error in its
interpretation and administration of the law." 9
Although the CIT ruled that the "plain meaning" of section 303
made it applicable to any governmental sudsidy,' 0 the Federal Cir-
cuit found the statute unclear on its face.' ' Although the statute was
originally enacted in 1897 when no NMEs existed, Congress has
since reenacted it six times without significant change.' 2 The court
concluded Congress did not intend to change its "scope or mean-
ing" beyond that of the original "provision . . . first enacted in the
last century."' 3 Because it lacked congressional direction, the court
7 Id. at 1313-14. Section 303 provides:
[W]henever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political
subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or cor-
poration, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty orgrant upon the
manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or
produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political
subdivision of government, then upon the importation of such article or mer-
chandise into the United States, whether the same shall be imported directly
from the country of production or otherwise, and whether such article or
merchandise is imported in the same condition as when exported from the
country of production or has been changed in condition by remanufacture or
otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in addition to any duties
otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however
the same be paid or bestowed.
Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (1982)) (emphasis added).
8 Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 549. The ITA supported its conclusion on four
grounds. First, a sudsidy, by definition, distorts the operation of the free market, which
does not exist in nonmarket economies. Id. Second, Congress has remained silent on the
nonmarket economy issue. Id. at 549-50. Third, some academic literature contends that
CVDs are inapplicable to NMEs. Id. at 550. Fourth, the Secretary of Commerce (ITA)
generally has broad discretion to determine the existence or nonexistence of subsidies. Id.
The ITA conclusion actually arose out of the carbon steel wire rod cases, not the
potash cases. Because the ITA rescinded its investigations into the potash cases after its
conclusion in the wire rod cases, the CIT consolidated the cases. Id. at 549.
) Id. at 550. The CIT based its reversal on four grounds. First, the ITA's conclusion
was contrary to the plain language and purpose of the statute which the CIT said "shows a
meticulous inclusiveness and an unswerving intention to cover all possible variations of
the acts sought to be counterbalanced." Id. Second, the CIT held the ITA's approach was
contradictory to prior judicial decisions on autocratic regimes. Id. at 555 (citing Downs v.
United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903), in which the Supreme Court upheld CVDs levied
against sugar exports from Czarist Russia). Third, the CIT contended that the ITA's con-
clusion was inconsistent with previous Commerce Department administration of the law
levying duties against products from Nazi Germany. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 555.
Fourth, the CIT noted that the ITA's determination contradicted the ITA's own admission
that the statute does not permit per se exemptions of any political entity. Id. at 550.
lo Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1314. See also Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 556.
1 1 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1314.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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had to determine whether Congress, at the time of enactment in
1897, would have applied the section to nonmarket economies if
they had existed in 1897.14
The court concluded that the "economic benefits and incen-
tives" 15 of the U.S.S.R. and G.D.R. did not constitute bounties or
grants under the 1897 Act and section 303 of the Tariff Act of
1930.16 The decision was based on three rationales: (1) the purpose
of CVD laws is to prevent unfair competitive advantages, and such
advantages do not result from NME imports; 17 (2) the nature of an
NME excludes the possibility of a subsidy since it would be subsi-
dizing itself;' 8 and (3) since the evolution of NMEs, Congress has
explicitly revised antidumping duty (AD)' 9 statutes to include NMEs
but has repeatedly not included NMEs under CVD statutes. 20
In reaching its decision, the court, citing the Supreme Court in
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,2 1 emphasized that CVDs are levied
to offset unfair competitive advantages of subsidized foreign produ-
cers. 22 When the foreign producer's government assumes some of
the expenses of production and sale in the United States, then U.S.
producers are put at a severe disadvantage. 23 Although a foreign
producer normally enters the U.S. market only if it can make a profit,
a subsidized foreign producer can enter the U.S. market even though
it would "otherwise . . not be in the seller's best economic interest
to do so. ' 24 Congress intended CVDs to protect against "this kind
14 Id.
15 The alleged subsidies on the potash imports were: (1) foreign exchange rates on
export sales higher than official rates; (2) equalization payments on export prices; and (3)
in the Soviet Union only, retention of a share of the hard currency received in the export
of the goods. Id. at 1315. The court did not determine whether the "economic benefits
and incentives" granted the potash imports were in fact subsidies. Id. at 1314. The court
referred to these as subsidies only "in the loosest sense of the term." Id. at 1316. Ge-
orgetown Steel may be read narrowly, holding only that the economic incentives involved
were not subsidies, therefore not countervailable. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying
text.
16 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1314.
17 Id. at 1315.
18 Id. at 1315-16.
10 The ITA may levy an AD duty on U.S. imports where there is price discrimination
between national markets; to artificially penetrate the U.S. market, the same or similar
product is sold at a lower price in the United States than the manufacturing country. Bar-
shefsky & Cunningham, The trosecution ofAntidunipingActions under the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307, 308-18 (1981). See generally J. VINER, DUMPING:
A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2d ed. 1966); 1 ANTIDUMPING LAW: POLICY AND IM-
PLEMENTATION (U. Mich. Press ed. 1979); 3 J. PATriSON, supra note 1, §§ 1.01-1.05.
20 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1316-17.
21 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
22 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1315. The court cited the following language in Zenith:
"The countervailing duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage that for-
eign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by their governments."
Id. (quoting Zenith, 437 U.S. at 455-56).
23 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1315.
24 Id.
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of 'unfair' competition." '25 On the other hand, NMEs are "riddled
with distortions." '26 Because prices, transfers, credit, wages, and
other economic decisions are centrally planned, "this kind of 'unfair'
competition cannot exist." 27
Second, the court argued that the nature of NMEs excludes sub-
sidization. The court found no evidence that the price would have
been greater if the U.S.S.R. or G.D.R. had exported the potash di-
rectly rather than through government-controlled exporting enti-
ties.28 Furthermore, the economic incentives did not allow the
entities involved to make sales in the United States that they could
not have made without the incentives.2 9 The court concluded that it
was illogical for NMEs to subsidize their manufacturers or exporters
because the governments would in effect be subsidizing
themselves. o
The court's final ground for its holding rested on Congress re-
peatedly including NMEs under AD statutes while omitting them
from CVD statutes.3' In the Trade Act of 1974,32 Congress explic-
itly amended the then current version of the AD law to include NMEs
while, at the same time, amending the CVD law without including
NMEs. 33 The court recognized that Congress had amended the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (1979 Act)3 4 in a similar manner.3 5
Moreover, the 1979 Act codified the Subsidies Code3 6 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which permitted signatory
25 Id.
26 Id. (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 19,376 (1984) (ITA negative determination in wire rod
cases)).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1316.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. The court wrote: "Those [AD] statutes indicate that Congress intended that
any selling by nonmarket economies at unreasonably low prices should be dealt with under
the antidumping law. There is no indication in any of those statutes, or their legislative
history, that Congress intended or understood that the countervailing duty law also would
apply." Id.
32 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975). The AD duty provisions, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-171 (1976), were repealed in 1979. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
3" Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1316. The court pointed out that Congress also en-
acted a "surrogate country" system for determining when dumping of NME goods occurs.
Id. The ITA designates a surrogate market economy with approximately the same GNP as
the NME and compares the U.S. import prices of the two countries. See generaly Horlick &
Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and 1.S. Antiduniping/Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT'L
LAw. 807, 828-30 (1984). Congress also established two methods of measuring dumping
by NMEs: (1) a constructed value calculation and (2) the actual selling price of some mar-
ket economy selling the same or similar product. Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1316.
34 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C. (1982)).
35 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1317.
'36 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.-I. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619
[hereinafter Subsidies Code].
1987]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 12
countries to levy either ADs or CVDs against NMEs using "surrogate
country" 37 pricing.38 While the CIT had concluded that congres-
sional enactment of the Subsidies Code was "overwhelming evi-
dence" of legislative intent to enforce both AD and CVD provisions
against NMEs, 39 the appeals court rejected this conclusion, stating
that the CIT's reasoning was a "non-sequitur," given Congress' fail-
ure to extend CVD laws to cover NMEs. 40 The Subsidies Code, ac-
cording to the court, allowed each signatory to choose its method of
handling underpriced NME goods, and Congress clearly had se-
lected ADs. 4 t
To reinforce its conclusion, the court noted deference to the ad-
ministrating agency. Following the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, 42 the court recognized that the ITA has broad discretion in
determining what is and is not a "bounty" or "grant" under section
303.43
Before analyzing whether CVDs can be levied against NMEs, a
review of the current CVD statutes is necessary.44 There are two
U.S. CVD statutes: section 701 of the 1979 Act, 45 applicable to sig-
37 See supra note 33.
38 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1317.
39 Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 556-57. The CIT wrote:
Article 15 of the [Subsidies] Code clearly gives a country the choice of using
subsidy [CVD] law or antidumping law for imports from a country with a
state-controlled economy. Moreover, Congress was informed that
nonmarket economies had participated in the preparation of the Code and
that it had been signed, subject to subsequent ratification, by two such coun-
tries [Hungary and Bulgaria, see Analysis of Nontariff Agreements, U.S.I.T.C.
Inv. No. 332-101 (1979)].
In the opinion of the Court ihis constitutes over-whelming evidence that
the 1979 Act shows a definite understanding by Congress that the counter-
vailing duty law covers countries with nonmarket economies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
40 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1317.
41 Id. at 1317-18.
42 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), affd, 437 U.S.
443 (1978).
43 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1318. "We cannot say that the Administration's
[ITA's] conclusion that the benefits the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Repub-
lic provided for the export of potash to the United States were not bounties or grants
under section 303 was unreasonable, not in accordance with law or an abuse of discre-
tion." Id.
44 For a more extensive review of U.S. CVD laws, see 3 J. PA'rrlsoN, supra note I,
§ § 1.04, 6.01-6.02[2 1; deKieffer, When, Why, and How to Bring a Countervailing Duty Proceed-
ing: A Complainant's Perspective, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 363 (1981); Sandier, Primer
on United States Trade Remedies, 19 INT'L LAW. 761, 769-772 (1985).
45 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 701, 93 Stat. 144, 151 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982)). Section 701 provides:
GENERAL RULE. -If-
(1) the administering authority determines that -
(A) a country under the Agreement [see infra note 36], or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or a
corporation, association, or other organization organized in such a
country,
is providing, directly or indirectly, a subsidy with respect to the manufacture,
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natories of certain GATT agreements, 4 6 and section 303 of the 1930
Act, 4 7 applicable to non-signatories. The latter provision was the
subject of Georgetown Steel. The major distinction between the two
statutes is that the International Trade Commission (ITC)48 must,
under section 701, make an affirmative determination that a U.S. in-
dustry is materially injured, threatened with material injury, or re-
tarded from establishment before the ITA may levy a CVD against a
GATT signatory. 49 No such requirement exists under section 303.
CVDs can be levied against non-signatories even when no U.S. in-
dustry is injured 5 ° unless the goods come duty-free from a signatory
country5' or an international agreement requires an injury determi-
nation. 52 Most NMEs are not signatories; only Hungary and Bulga-
ria have signed the applicable agreements.5 3
CVDs are levied to offset any unfair trade advantage a foreign
exporter obtains over U.S. manufacturers from subsidies paid by for-
eign governments.5 4 Both the ITA and various courts have found
actionable subsidies in direct government equity participation, 5 5
production, or exportation of a class or kind of merchandise imported into the
United States, and
(2) the Commission determines that -
(A) an industry in the United States -
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is mate-
rially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise, then there shall be imposed upon
such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed,
equal to the amount of the net subsidy.
Id.
46 Id. § 1671(b). The applicable agreements are the Subsidies Code, supra note 36,
and the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 492, T.I.A.S. No. 9650 [hereinafter Antidump-
ing Article].
47 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
48 The ITC, an independent presidential commission approved by the Senate (see 19
U.S.C. § 1330 (1982)), is responsible for determining domestic injury. 19 U.S.C. § 1332
(1982). The ITA, an office of the Department of Commerce, is responsible for determin-
ing the existence of a subsidy, measuring the subsidy, and levying a countervailing duty.
See 3 J. PAT-rtsoN, supra note 1, § 1.04.
49 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982). See also supra note 44. Although the Trade Agree-
ments Act § 701(2) requires the ITC to make an affirmative determination of domestic
injury, the Tariff Act of 1930 § 303 has no such language. See supra note 7. A "material
injury" is a "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(A) (1982).
5 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). See also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
51 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982).
52 Id.
53 See Analysis of Nontariff Agreements, U.S.I.T.C. Inv. No. 332-101 (1979).
54 Zenith, 437 U.S. at 445.
55 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Steel Products
from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304 (1982) (subsidy found in company debt converted to
government equity).
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preferential interest rate loans, 56 direct grants, 57 raw material cost
subsidization, 58 tax benefits, 59 export rebates, 60 reduced state-pro-
vided transportation rates,61 and exchange rate benefits.62 This list
illustrates that countervailable subsidies may occur at any time or
point in the manufacture, production, or export of goods.
Before Georgetown Steel, the leviability of CVDs against NMEs was
strictly a matter of academic dispute.63 There are two opposing
schools of thought. 64 The first view is that no subsidy can exist be-
cause NMEs are driven through government intervention and, there-
fore, no "commercial benchmarks" are available to measure
government assistance. 6 5 The second school views the definition of
subsidy more broadly, arguing that a subsidy can exist whenever a
government shows preferential treatment to a particular good above
the normal or average level of treatment by the government regard-
less of the type of economy. 66
The first petition seeking CVDs against NME goods was Initia-
tion of Countervailing Duty Investigations; Textiles, Apparel, and Related
Products from the People's Republic of China.67 The case was terminated
56 Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico; Countervailing Duty Determination, 49
Fed. Reg. 23,097 (1984).
57 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain Steel Products from
the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,345 (1982) (subsidy found in govern-
ment grant to purchase equipment).
58 Id. at 39,348 (government assistance to coke producers held countervailable sub-
sidy on German steel imports).
59 Countervailing Duties; Final Affirmative Determination, Steel Pipe and Tube Prod-
ucts from South Africa, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,928 (1983) (tax credits and deductions linked to
exports held subsidy).
60 Id.
61 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations and Countervailing Duty
Orders; Certain Steel Products from South Africa, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,379 (1982) (subsidy
found in preferential rail rates for exports).
62 Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606 (Cust. Ct. 1963) (sub-
sidy found in Uruguayan exchange rates benefitting wool products exporters).
63 See, e.g., Horlick & Shuman, supra note 33, at 828-29.
64 Id. at 829.
65 Id.
66 Id. The CIT apparently adopted the second school of thought holding a subsidy
may be found in "beneficial deviations" from "patterns of regularity." Continental Steel,
614 F. Supp. at 554.
67 48 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (1983). The arguments by the domestic manufactures favor-
ing the levy of CVDs were: I) the plain language of the Tariff Act of 1930 § 303 uses the
term "any country," making it applicable to NMEs; 2) the legislative history states § 303 is
to prevent unfair competition of' foreign governments, without regard to market or
nonmarket economy; and 3) international agreements to which the United States is a party
reflect an equal application of CVDs to market and nonmarket economies. Recent Devel-
opment, Countervailing Duties and Non-Alarket Economies: The Case of the Peoples Republic of
China, 10 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 405, 408-10 (1983). The arguments offered by the
importers opposing CVDs were: 1) the plain language of § 303 applies to free market
economies only because "bount[ies] or grant[s]" are not found in NMEs; 2) while there is
no legislative history requiring CVDs be applied to NME goods, there is history for apply-
ing ADs to NME goods; and, 3) international agreements to which the United States is a
party do not require application of CVDs against NMEs. Id. at 410-12.
GEORGETOWN STEEL
before the ITA delivered a preliminary opinion. 6 Next arose the
steel wire rod cases (the subject of the procedural issue in Georgetown
Steel69), in which the ITA held CVDs inapplicable to NMEs because
subsidies were market distortions that could not occur in NMEs. 70
After its determination in the steel wire rod cases, the ITA rescinded
its on-going investigations in the potash cases (the subject of the
substantive issue in Georgetown Steel 71 and this Note). 72 U.S. manufac-
turers appealed the administrative decisions, and the CIT consoli-
dated both cases, holding that countervailable subsidies can be
found in NMEs. 73
Due to the lack of prior case law on levying CVDs against NME
goods, Georgetown Steel is especially significant. Because all ITA de-
terminations are appealed to the CIT, 74 and CIT decisions are ap-
pealed to the Federal Circuit, 75 Georgetown Steel settles that
countervailable subsidies may not be found on NME goods. 76 Fur-
thermore, Georgetown Steel increases the importance of ADs because
CVDs are no longer available as countertrade measures against
NMEs.
Finally, Georgetown Steel relieves the ITA of the potentially impos-
sible task of measuring subsidies in an NME. Although ADs are
based on price discrimination, 77 CVDs are based on subsidies that,
in a centralized economy, are potentially immeasureable. To moni-
tor the normal allocation of resources flowing to every NME export
in order to determine when an alleged subsidy occurs, as the CIT
suggested, 78 would significantly multiply ITA administrative work.
As trade barriers to countries behind the iron and bamboo cur-
tains are lifted, CVDs on NME goods must also be removed, if the
goal is consistency. All production in NMEs involves government
intervention. To hold that this intervention amounts to countervail-
68 Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products from The People's Republic of China;
Termination of Countervailing Duty Investigations, 48 Fed. Reg. 55,492 (1983).
69 See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.
70 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (1984); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final
Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (1984).
71 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1313-18.
72 Potash from the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R., 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984).
73 Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 549.
74 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(a) (West Supp. 1986).
75 28 U.S.C. § 2645(c) (1982).
76 Congress, however, is considering several proposals addressing the nonmarket
economy import problem. See Hardt & Boone, Trade Control Polic., CONG. REs. SERV. REV.
Feb. 1987, at 29, 30. One proposal actually eliminates the applicability of either ADs or
CVDs against NMEs, instead establishing an artificial pricing mechanism where NMEs
which supply pricing information to the U.S. government could be treated as if free market
economies. 131 CONG. REC. S 11378 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985).
77 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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able subsidies could all but end trade with NMEs since all NME
products would be subject to duties.
ADs are the proper unfair trade duty against NME products. If
an NME product, after adjustments for exchange rates, transporta-
tion fees, and similar expenses, 79 costs less in the U.S. market than
the home or third country market, then an AD may be leviable. If the
NME product does not cost more after proper adjustments, then an
AD is not available. Thus, ADs are a more realistic remedy because,
unlike CVDs, they do not look to government intervention but con-
sider sales price differential.8 0
The lifting of trade barriers has also created a free trade versus
fair trade controversy. While free trade proponents want little or no
state-imposed tariffs or duties to facilitate international trade, fair
trade proponents want tariffs and restrictions on all states which un-
fairly advantage their producers and exporters. In NMEs with low
labor costs, it is likely that goods can be produced less expensively
than in the United States. Fair traders may argue that repressive la-
bor conditions in many NMEs constitute a form of subsidy because
wage earners must work for less than a natural market rate. Ge-
orgetown Steel takes a middle ground in the free versus fair trade con-
troversy: The case limits random CVD levying against NMEs but
reaffirms congressional support for AD duties when unfair dumping
occurs.
8
'
Returning to the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this
Note, clearly the ITA could levy a CVD against subsidized goods
from the market economy of the Southern Republic of the Pacific.
Any subsidy could be investigated, ascertained, measured, and offset
by ITA officials.82 Even most free traders would not oppose the lev-
ying of such a CVD. Since the Southern Republic acted first to re-
duce market prices artificially, the CVD only helps restore the price
to its natural market level, albeit through an artificial mechanism.
Under Georgetown Steel, CVDs are not leviable against the
nonmarket economy of the Northern People's Republic of the Pa-
cific, despite state-determined prices which are significantly lower
than U.S. market prices. Without Georgetown Steel, the ITA would be
711 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982) (proper methodology for obtaining and construct-
ing prices to measure dumping).
8(' Although AD duties levied against NME goods appear to be more reasonable than
CVDs, the application of ADs to NME products may also be called into question. For an
analysis of the problems inherent in AD duties, see Corr, The NME Import Regulation Deba-
cle: Tho Proposals for a ANew Regulatory Approach, 12 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 59 (1987).
81 See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
82 If, of course, the Southern Republic is a signatory to the applicable agreements
(Subsidies Code, supra note 36; Antidumping Article, supra note 46), only § 701 of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is available, and the IHC would have to make a "material
injury" determination before the ITA could levy the CVD. See supra notes 45-49 and ac-
companying text.
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charged with ascertaining some subsidy arising out of the deviation
in normal state-allocations8 3 which likely fluctuate each year as a re-
sult of state planners' adjustments to annual allocations. Because of
the subjectiveness of this determination, not only is the margin of
error great but the potential for abuse is significant, especially when
political pressure is raining down from the White House or Con-
gress. Instead, Georgetown Steel implicitly directs the ITA to apply
ADs to NMEs using mechanisms 84 that, although not perfect, 85 are
less subject to abuse. If there is evidence that the price in the United
States is less, after proper adjustments,8 6 than the price in the home
or third country, then the ITA may levy an AD duty. 8 7
Georgetown Steel, on the other hand, may be read narrowly. The
Federal Circuit did not clearly hold that CVDs are never applicable
to NME goods. Instead, the decision may be read as rendering
CVDs inapplicable only to the particular subsidies involved in the
case. 88 Calling them subsidies "in the loosest sense of the term," 89
the court simply did not believe that these were the type of subsidies
intended as "bount[ies]" or "grant[s]" under section 303.90 Thus, a
practitioner petitioning for CVDs against NME goods may, in good
faith, distinguish Georgetown Steel from other alleged subsidies on
NME goods.
Although the issue of levying CVDs against NMEs was a non-
issue just a few years ago, it will undoubtably grow in importance
with the liberalization of formerly closed NMEs. Although Ge-
orgetown Steel does not resolve all the problems associated with the
application of CVDs to NMEs, it is a first step. What is needed is a
clearer understanding of how to apply U.S. trade laws to NMEs. 9'
Consequently, Congress needs to clarify the application of U.S.
trade laws to NMEs by enacting pending legislation 92 or by drafting
new legislation. Congress' amendment of AD laws to include NMEs
is inadequate. Because the economic structure of an NME is anti-
83 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 19, 33 and accompanying text.
85 See supra note 80.
86 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
89 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1316. See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
90 Id. Evidence of this narrow reading is found in the following language:
[W]e conclude that the economic incentives and benefits that the Soviet Union and
German Democratic Republic have provided for the export of potash from
those countries to the United States do not constitute bounties or grants
under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.
Id. at 1314 (emphasis added). By emphasizing this narrow language, a practitioner can
argue the remainder of the case is dicta.
91 NMEs are a relatively new and unique economic phenomenon. As one author
noted, the earliest versions of CVD laws were enacted before the Bolshevik Revolution.
Sandier, supra note 44, at 771.
92 See supra note 76.
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thetical to U.S. economic theory, Congress should develop a com-
prehensive trade bill dealing with NMEs. Only in this manner can
Congress balance the interests of U.S. consumers who enjoy the
lower prices of NME goods and U.S. manufacturers who are injured
by the competition created, ironically, by non-competitive
economies.
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